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Kafka's World: FSB and 'Law
By BORIS PUSTINTSEV
Citizens' Watch (1)
During decades in which the Soviet regime failed to impose legal limitations on the 
security organs, these services became accustomed to relying on "administrative 
measures," even when such measures were contradictory to the law. Today's Federal 
Security Service (FSB) spares no effort to perpetuate those practices. The infamous 
case of the ecologist Aleksandr Nikitin rests on FSB attempts to support the espionage 
charge by using defense ministry regulations that were never published for the general 
public and therefore cannot be used as a criterion for guilt or innocence. Although the 
General Prosecutor's Office required the FSB to remove all references to unpublished 
acts from the indictment in April 1998, the case against Nikitin remains open.
The security services are trying to extend a similar approach to the communication 
networks that provide electronic mail and Internet access to the public. Officially the 
FSB insists that its surveillance of electronic communication aims at curbing crime and 
corruption; however, we have reason to suppose that the main targets are in fact highly 
placed federal and regional officials, political and social activists, and journalists. At a 
time when kompromat (2) wars define Russian politics, the surveillance of private 
correspondence of public figures can serve as a very useful tool in the hands of some 
not so savory characters. Journalists constitute a target because e-mail can help to 
identify the source of information which certain political figures or the FSB would wish to 
suppress.
The Russian Federation law "On Operational-Investigative Activity" requires all Internet 
providers to supply the FSB with technical data from their mail servers and to install a 
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System of Operational-Investigative Activities (SORM) on their mail servers. These 
actions provide the FSB with the technical capability to inspect client correspondence 
on that server, but the mechanism is only to become operational when a court-ordered 
warrant is presented to authorize the surveillance of a particular client's e-mail. The 
FSB, however, chafes under such restrictions: Imagine having to obtain a warrant! 
Referring to unpublished decrees of the Ministry of Communication [No. 226 (June 24, 
1992), No. 252 (November 11, 1994) and No. 25 (February 18, 1997)], and in the 
absence of a court document, the security service has demanded access to information 
about subscribers and the correspondence of certain persons. Thus, the FSB is using 
secret regulations to compel the service providers to break the law.
Law-abiding martyrs
The communication ministry decrees punish recalcitrant providers by denying them a 
new license or revoking their existing license. In theory, the provider can disobey FSB 
dictates and, if subjected to extralegal or administrative reprisals, he can go to court, 
possibly winning the case. In practice, everyone knows that martyr-providers are 
scarce: Those who seek justice in the courts would go broke long before their cases 
even reached the trial. The prevalent lack of faith in the judicial system, particularly in its 
ability to enforce the law against the powerful security agencies, virtually guarantees the 
FSB freedom from client-instigated litigation.
It is not known how many providers across Russia systematically break federal law and 
infringe on the constitutional rights of their subscribers by allowing the FSB to observe 
all electronic correspondence without court sanctions. Intimidated owners and network 
administrators do not publicize such activity. One extraordinary person who refused to 
break the law for the sake of the FSB finally emerged in November 1998: Oleg Syrov, 
the manager of the Bayard-Slavia Communications (BSK) joint-stock company in 
Volgograd, declared that he would install a SORM only if the FSB demands did not 
violate constitutional norms and federal laws. In response, the head of the regional FSB, 
General Viktor Kolesnikov, contacted the agency charged with monitoring the service 
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providers (Gossvyaz'nadzor) of the Volgograd oblast' and "strongly recommended" that 
it revoke BSK's license.
The monitoring agency conducted a review and found that there were no grounds to 
revoke the operating license in this case. The agency sent the FSB a letter repeating 
that BSK stands ready to cooperate if the use of SORM conforms to the law. Thereafter 
BSK was subjected to an avalanche of FSB-inspired inspections -- a tax audit, visits 
from the police division for the fight against corruption, etc. Suddenly, in February, Syrov 
resigned. The FSB continues to look for a reason to deprive the BSK of its license, 
thereby intimidating other potential "rebels." The BSK owner, Yuri Skorokhodov, told me 
in March that he will not give in to blackmail and stands ready to take this case to court. 
He asked Citizens' Watch to help him appeal to the European Court in the event that the 
Russian court finds for the FSB.
The service provider has ample grounds for a legal case. Article 23, Paragraph 2 of the 
Russian Constitution states, "Each person has the right to privacy of correspondence, 
telephone conversations, and postal, telegraph, and other communications. Limitation of 
this right is permitted only on the basis of a judicial decision." The relevant legislation, 
"On the FSB, " "On Communication, " and "On Operational-Investigative Activity" 
elucidate this principle: To monitor private correspondence, the FSB must obtain a 
warrant.
Our legal system retains certain atavistic traits dating from the Soviet period when legal 
norms were arbitrarily applied. Many Russian laws suffer from an identical defect, 
supporting a very broad range of interpretation. To press its case, the FSB has been 
able to exploit a seeming contradiction in the law. On the one hand, the court decision 
comes into effect only after certain procedural conditions have been met. In the given 
case, the procedural conditions are minimal; for instance, a service provider cannot 
appeal a warrant authorizing the surveillance of a client's e-mail. However, the minimal 
procedural requirement must be fulfilled -- the FSB must show the warrant. If the 
warrant is not presented to the service provider, he can hardly be expected to abide by 
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it. The FSB and the court can do with the document whatever they like, but they cannot 
keep it hidden and apply it to third parties.
On the other hand, Article 12 of the law "On Operational-Investigative Activity" states, 
"The judicial decision authorizing operational-investigative measures and the materials 
that constituted the basis for the court finding are stored only in the organs that carry out 
the operational-investigative activities. " From our point of view, the FSB's right to store 
the document does not obviate its obligation to present a warrant to the service 
provider. Otherwise, the service provider has to take the existence of the warrant on 
faith, and the absurdity of the situation approaches Kafka's novel The Trial.
Procurator's interpretation
Of course, the FSB and the procuracy see matters in an entirely different light. Aleksei 
Simonov, the president of Glasnost Defense Fund, the very well-regarded Moscow 
human rights group, recently lodged a complaint with the Volgograd Procuracy. On 
February 22, 1999 the Volgograd procurator, Viktor Glagolkin, responded that the 
presentation of a warrant "contradicts" Article 12 cited above. That response suggests 
that the provider should simply take FSB agents at their word. Moreover, the provider 
does not even need to know which client is being observed. If the procurator's 
interpretation becomes the norm, the FSB would be given limitless access to the 
providers' data -- an outcome that negates a series of constitutional guarantees.
Without getting bogged down in too many legal technicalities, it should be mentioned 
that a provider who allows the FSB to conduct surveillance without seeing a warrant 
violates Article 138, Paragraph 2, and Article 286 of the Criminal Code. The FSB agents 
who press the provider into breaking the law are liable under the same articles.
Not content with the current range of surveillance possibilities, the FSB has developed a 
new version of SORM, called SORM-2, which governs e-mail, cellular telephones, and 
pagers. Unlike the other documents mentioned in this article, Citizens' Watch has not 
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been able to obtain a copy of the SORM-2 regulations; apparently, development of the 
system has not been completed. However, it is known that in all cases the system would 
operate in the same manner. The service provider gives the FSB the equipment 
necessary to conduct surveillance from a remote location (up to 16 kilometers from the 
mail server) -- that is, from the FSB office. This access would extend to monitoring the 
frequency and duration of a client's use of his e-mail account, as well as providing the 
ability to identify the client's correspondents and to obtain the information in the 
correspondence. Moreover, the FSB could block certain communications or even alter 
their content and no one, including the service provider, would be able to detect such 
activities. If and when SORM-2 becomes operational, the only safeguard remaining will 
be the provision that the FSB must have a warrant to make such materials obtained 
through surveillance admissible in court. At least for now we have this measure of 
protection: Next year, who knows?
Notes:
(1) Citizens' Watch is a nongovernmental human rights organization based in St. 
Petersburg.
(2) Kompromat refers to efforts (usually by the "services") to collect (or fabricate) 
compromising material -- of a criminal, pornographic, or "treasonous" nature -- against 
persons or an organization deemed to be "targets."
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